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In recent years, the insights of behavioral law and economics scholars
have improved the efficacy of various forms of contract-regimes through
substantive legal reforms ranging from the CARD Act to a revamped
RESPA. These insights and reforms attempted to optimize consumer choice
architecture and enhance overall consumer decision-making utility,
primarily by a combination of new information-deployment techniques
and various consumer nudges, in both standardized paper formats and
online. But much more can be done to build on these insights and improve
decision-making in this space – in order to maximize utility for historically
marginalized groups. This Article argues that as more traditional
commercial transactions move online, they can be more easily customized
to directly engage consumers by directly taking into account a consumer’s
race and other demographic factors.
Encouraging discrimination in contract formation comes with
potential barriers and costs. Certain federal and state regulations prohibit
the acquisition and use of such data. Privacy experts caution against the
expansive use of online tools and algorithms designed to inferentially
gather such data. Consumer demand for racially customized online
interactions is uncertain. And, the potential for corporate misuse of such
data, to discriminate in harmful ways, is possible. But these concerns
should be measured against potential market benefits and can be
addressed by rigorous data analysis of completed contracts. In certain
regulated consumer markets, digital platforms that would seek to acquire
race data and customize contracts would be required to permit regulators
to evaluate whether such contract disclosures and contract terms were
discriminatory. Ultimately, in the absence of a more transparent and
honest dialogue about the present acquisition and use of such information
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in online contracts, an unregulated market can utilize such information at
will and without scrutiny – which runs the risk of harming consumers and
carries unknown benefits.
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INTRODUCTION: COUNTING RACE AND MAKING IT COUNT
As individual consumers, we respond to, utilize, and learn from
advertising, marketing, disclosure, and information regimes, in print
and online, on a daily basis. As traditional consumer contract markets
have moved to digital formats, contract-making has become both more
personalized and more automated based upon the engagement of
personal preferences. 1 Many of these consumer markets are regulated
with a light touch, if at all, and thus the full extent of a typical marketseller’s use of a customer’s personal data to structure terms is unclear. 2
1
See Rory Van Loo, Digital Market Perfection, 117 MICH. L. REV. 815 (2019) (predicting
far greater automation of consumer transactions based on personal preferences). See also Joshua
A.T. Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. ONLINE 35, 38 (2014).
2
For this reason, it is difficult to assess whether and how the use of such data impacts
consumer utility in those markets. To the extent that consumers are harmed in those markets, the
interventions described here would prove costly. However, to the extent that the transparency
proposed here identifies differential and negative market effects for certain consumer segments,
such evidence could serve as the empirical basis to expand regulatory oversight of “light-touch”
markets.
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But, in other consumer markets, whether online or in-person, the federal
government structures the methods by which market actors engage
consumers from the earliest stages of the contract formation process,
such as with mandated consumer disclosures for prescription drugs or
consumer credit products. 3
This Article argues that corporations subject to these additional
oversight regimes should be encouraged to gather socio-demographic
information for print and online transactions and customize contracts
based upon that information. The decision-enhancing framework
underlying consumer disclosure law finds its original source in law and
economics principles, namely that individuals, once identified and
provided with information, will “rationally optimize their choices, given
their preferences, information, and the incentives they face.” 4 The Truth
in Lending Act ("TILA") was enacted with this basic premise. 5
Moreover, information’s rationalizing effect should protect and enhance
the interests of consumers by positioning them to make welfareoptimizing decisions. Policymakers are increasingly relying on digital
intermediaries to play that rationalizing role through disclosures aimed
at machines. If those machines are supposed to help consumers, and if
a consumer’s interests are tied to their socio-demographic background,
why shouldn’t corporations be able to incorporate and utilize this
information in ways consistent with decision-enhancing principles? 6
As leading scholars from other areas have recognized, race, gender
and other factors can be excluded from evaluating and informing a
3
This principle can be broadly applied to a range of government sanctioned information
dissemination regimes. Here, the information of particular value is consumer disclosure,
specifically with respect to consumer finance. One of the earliest modern examples of this
strategy, of course, is pursuant to the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, as
amended, (49 U.S.C. 30112(a), 30115). National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,
49 U.S.C. §§ 30112(a), 30115 (1966). Under the Act, a motor vehicle manufactured for sale in
the United States must have affixed a label certifying compliance with various mandates and
applicable standards. The label, among other things, must identify the vehicle's manufacturer,
its date of manufacture, the Gross Vehicle Weight Rating or GVWR, the Gross Axle Weight
Rating or GAWR of each axle, the vehicle type classification (e.g., passenger car, multipurpose
passenger vehicle, truck, bus, motorcycle, trailer, low-speed vehicle), and the vehicle's Vehicle
Identification Number or “VIN.” 49 C.F.R. § 567.4 (2013).
4
See Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why,
127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1602 (2014). As explained infra, recent efforts by BLE scholars to
improve such laws have necessarily challenged this assumption.
5
Matthew Edwards, (quoting ELIZABETH RENUART & KATHLEEN E. KEEST, TRUTH IN
LENDING § 1.1.1, at 33 (4th ed. 1999) (describing TILA as “Congress’s effort to guarantee the
accurate and meaningful disclosure of the costs of consumer credit and thereby to enable
consumers to make informed choices in the credit marketplace”).
6
See Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L. J. 1267 (2017) ("The
administrative state is leveraging algorithms to influence individuals' private decisions.")
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decision-making process, but “from a technical perspective . . . this
approach is naïve. Blindness to a sensitive attribute has long been
recognized as an insufficient approach to making a process fair.” 7 The
resultant product is “insufficient to assure fairness and compliance with
substantive policy choices.” 8 Thus, to maximize the effectiveness of
consumer transactions in a digital era, we may need to focus less on how
such transactions affect consumers generally and more on how such
transactions are designed for, utilized by, and impact marginalized
consumer groups, particularly racial and ethnic groups. 9
There are critiques of this approach, discussed later in Section III,
including whether such a regime implicates privacy concerns and
whether government’s encouragement of “discrimination” in this
context violates core moral or ethical principles. But it is useful to begin
with a third critique about the underlying theory and evidence for such
an approach: by and large, we do not know how, when, and why we
might expect consumers from different groups to respond differently to
particular types of contracts. 10 However, this absence of evidence is
partly because much consumer contract and behavioral law and
economics (“BLE”) disclosure-centered scholarship has often swept
socio-demographic variables like race under the behavioral rug,
exacerbating this empirical dilemma.
A. The Importance of Evaluating Racial Differences in Commercial Law
Scholarship
When we believe race matters, as an independent explanatory or
causal variable to differentiate consumer interests, experiences, or
7
See Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg,
David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 685 (2016)
(discussing ECOA’s Reg B. prohibitions – and their failings – within a larger framework about
debiasing machine algorithms).
8
Id.
9
Though not the primary focus of this Article, financial literacy and education regimes
similarly suffer from a lack of focus on the information needs of marginalized groups. See
Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 228-29 (2008)
(arguing that remedies must be context-specific to be impactful). See also Final Report
President’s Advisory Council on Financial Capability, FINAL REPORT, 10 (2013),
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/financialeducation/Documents/PACFC%20Interim%20Report%20-%20January%2018,%202012.pdf
(stating that recommendations should “take into account the particular needs of traditionally
underserved populations (e.g., women, minorities, low- and moderate-income consumers, and
the elderly)").
10
See, e.g., Dalié Jiménez, D. James Greiner, Lois R. Lupica & Rebecca L. Sandefur,
Improving the Lives of Individuals in Financial Distress Using a Randomized Control Trial: A
Research and Clinical Approach, 20 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 449 (2013).
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contract outcomes, academics and government policy makers should
encourage private actors and government regulators to acquire that
information and then to utilize it to inform or improve law and public
policy. 11 Similarly, when we see an absence of effort to gather or analyze
or deploy such information, it sends a clear message that the underlying
social phenomenon or policy problem either should not or does not
implicate race or racial justice matters. In short, when race matters,
government and private actors should count it, analyze it, and use the
resulting knowledge and information to reduce disparities and improve
public welfare. 12 Within academia, we expect the same level of effort. 13
While encouraging the acquisition of racial demographics for
commercial transactions may not always yield an obvious net utility, 14
there is general agreement that racial difference permeates a variety of
consumer contract regimes in a variety of ways. 15 But, in the context of
recognizing the role of race in communicating with consumers, legal
scholars in other fields are far ahead of commercial law academics. 16
B. Generic Consumer Contract Approaches
We know the fallacy of the central assumption of traditional law and
economics approaches to individual decision making — that consumers
are rational maximizers of their strategic goals. 17,18 Drawing upon social
science research, BLE scholars proved that human behavior and
11

worse.

This assumes that government generally seeks to make such policies better, rather than

12
See Ming Hsu Chen & Taeku Lee, Reimagining Democratic Inclusion: Asian Americans
and the Voting Rights Act, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 359 (2013) (advocating for broader data
gathering and data analysis by race to improve efficacy of voting rights laws).
13
See, e.g., Gregory S. Parks, Toward a Critical Race Realism, 17 CORNELL J. OF L. AND
PUB. POL. 683 (2008) (encouraging critical race theorists to deploy social science data analysis
methodologies when analyzing law and public policy problems). See also Devon W. Carbado &
Daria Roithmayr, Critical Race Theory Meets Social Science, 10 ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC. SCI.
149 (2014) (explaining how social science research offers critical race theory scholars a useful
methodology).
14
See Jonathan D. Kahn, Patenting Race, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY, Nov. 2006, at 1349
(2006) (raising concerns about utilizing race as a variable when petitioning the government in
patent and drug-approval spaces).
15
See, e.g., Rory Van Loo, The Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 57980 (2016) (observing that sellers’ algorithms have the potential to lessen some forms of racial
discrimination and exacerbate others).
16
See, e.g., Dayna Bowen Matthew, Race, Religion, and Informed Consent — Lessons from
Social Science, 36 J. OF L., MED. & ETHICS 150 (2008) (gathering and analyzing empirical and
historical data to re-contextualize the role of race and ethnicity in informed consent agreements).
17
See, e.g., RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS
ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
18
Bubb and Pildes, supra note 4.
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decision-making consistently differs from that of the rational actor. 19
Accordingly, such scholars contend that policymakers should legislate
with an eye toward “minimiz[ing] the individual mistakes that create
behavioral market failures and . . . mitigate their negative
consequences.” 20 With respect to one such area of law, disclosure law
regimes, they believe that government-mandated disclosures – provided
through market intermediaries, should “focus . . . on helping [real]
people help themselves.” 21
“To date, the work in BLE has been surprisingly circumscribed,” 22
and, by assuming that “many” or “most” consumers exhibit the same
behavioral biases that impact rational decision-making in the same way,
much BLE literature falls victim to the presumptive errors also made in
law and economics theory. 23 In other words, BLE improves upon
rational-actor models by anticipating predictable forms of decisionmaking errors, but also assumes that all consumers act irrationally in
consistent ways or make imperfect decisions using information in a
predictably imperfect manner. By baselining these models, and then
subsequent policy and law derived therefrom, on a “universal” person,
this suggests, but does not explicitly state, that the consumer is racially
white – and male. 24
Thus, when relying on this assumption of a mythical universal
generic consumer, there is less need to engage the efficacy, impact, or
value of incorporating consumer demographic differences in consumer
contracts, as there is no accompanying theoretical explanation for why
such consumers would be expected to process information differently or
yield different utility from similar decisions. Therefore, if this core BLE
assumption were true, disclosure models or digital “smart contracts”
created for a singular class of “irrational” consumers would prove
effective in reducing noise, increasing decision-making efficiencies,
and leaving consumers better off – as a whole – than without the
information.
But what if a contract formation’s utility function varies across a
range of socio-demographic groups? For example, one of the few largeSee, e.g., Thaler and Sunstein, supra note 17.
Bubb and Pildes, supra note 4, at 1605.
21
Id. at 1604.
22
Id.
23
Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew
Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for “Asymmetric
Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1219 (2003). (“[W]e can divide consumers into two
types: those who are boundedly rational (in the sense described above) and those who are fully
rational; and that (2) a fraction, p, of consumers fall into the boundedly rational category.”),
24
See generally IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW (1999).
19
20
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scale credit-granting disclosure experiments confirms that the quality
and visibility of consumer disclosures specifically matter for vulnerable
high-risk populations, who “are rate sensitive only if the interest rate
information is prominently disclosed.” 25 Similarly, the empirical
relationship between contract-formation choices, credit-card profiles,
and certain socio-demographic information (especially race) is still
uncertain, though suggestive of group-based differences. 26 Therefore, it
is consistent with the limited scholarship that exists that certain
population sub-groups could react sub-optimally (or simply differently)
to proposed contracts and terms that others (a majority) use efficiently
and rationally. 27 If this is true, even rational economic decision making
- mediated through information - is not uniformly distributed. 28 Yet,
contract disclosure and formation defaults, particularly as they are
operationalized – in style, language, and substance – are effectively
white. But in the digital world, the provision of information and
disclosure could instead be focused on customizing the contract
formation process to maximize the economic-utility and welfare of
population sub-groups. 29 If the provision of information can be designed
to maximize the utility of sub-groups such that it serves to enhance not
25
See Bruno Ferman, Reading the Fine Print: Credit Demand and Information Disclosure
in Brazil, 62 MGMT. SCI. 3534 (2015) (conducting a large-scale credit card disclosure
experiment in Brazil and finding, in part, that “most borrowers are highly rate-sensitive, whether
or not interest rates are prominently disclosed in marketing materials. An exception is high-risk
borrowers, for whom rate disclosure matters.”)
26
A number of studies have shown correlation between (perceived) race and credit scores,
suggesting that, in fact, there are clear financial health differences by population, although the
causes of such differences remain largely unknown. See, e.g., EEOC, May 16 Hearing Record
(statement of Adam T. Klein) (citing the 2000 Freddie Mac National Consumer Credit Survey)
(correlation between race and credit score); Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS ON CREDIT SCORING AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE AVAILABILITY AND
AFFORDABILITY
OF
CREDIT
80–81
(2007),
available
at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/creditscore/creditscore.pdf.
(finding
African-Americans and Latinos have lower credit scores than other racial/ethnic groups); Matt
Fellowes, Brookings Inst., CREDIT SCORES, REPORTS, AND GETTING AHEAD IN AMERICA 2
(2006),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/credit-scores-reports-and-getting-ahead-inamerica (showing correlation between percentage of racial minority residents and a U.S.
county’s average credit score).
27
See, e.g., David Hoffman, From Promise to Form: How Contracting Online Changes
Consumers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1595 (2016) (demonstrating, in part, that socio-demographic
differences in consumer groups are associated with differing views about the contract formation
process and the implications for contract breach).
28
See, e.g., Mintel, HISPANIC FINANCES AND FINANCIAL SERVICES (2009) (finding higher
Latino race-differential response rates to the question “I know nothing about financial
services/investments.”)
29
See Shmuel I. Becher, Yuval Feldman, and Orly Lobel, Poor Consumer(s) Law: The Case
of High-Cost Credit and Payday Loans in LEGAL APPLICATIONS OF MARKETING THEORY,
Jacob Gersen & Joel Steckel, eds., Cambridge University Press (2019, Forthcoming).
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only the general public welfare but the welfare and maximal utility of
sub-groups as well, the result would be a more optimal outcome than
the status-quo. 30 And while some scholars have innovatively encouraged
a “performance test” of various disclosure and contract-formation
regimes to further enhance consumer utility, 31 such tests still compare
the utility maximizing effect of such differentiated regimes on the
outcomes for the consumer population as a whole – rather than distinct
sub-groups. Instead, the approach here contemplates a variant of what
others have described as a consumer finance “randomized control trial,”
in which digital experimentation with how consumer contract
disclosures are provided and the efficacy of particular terms will allow
for a real-time gathering of evidence of what works best – holding the
socio-demographics of the reference-group constant. 32 Such
experimentation can be achieved faster through digital contracts and the
use of online platforms, which would also allow for a more rapid
aggregation of evidence about the efficacy of this approach.
However, recognizing that this approach is not without its
weaknesses, this Article responds to those who may believe this
approach to contract formation will do more harm than good. 33
I. CRITIQUES OF DISCLOSURE LAW AND A CRITIQUE OF THOSE
CRITIQUES
Because the purpose of disclosure law, as mentioned, is to enable
rational decision-making by consumers, the law and economics
movement—and its critics—have comprised the foundation of scholarly
commentary on the impact and efficacy of consumer disclosure laws, to
the exclusion of those focused on achieving racial justice. Most
30
See Kroll, et. al., supra note 7, at 682 (acknowledging privacy concerns and reviewing
potential discriminatory effects in using algorithms but suggesting that “there may be cases
where allowing an algorithm to consider protected class status can actually make outcomes
fairer. This may require a doctrinal shift, as, in many cases, consideration of protected status in
a decision is presumptively a legal harm.”)
31
Lauren E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1316
(2015) (footnotes omitted).
32
See, e.g., Jimenez et. al., supra note 10, at 470 (describing a large-scale mixed-methods
research study to gauge the effectiveness of financial health interventions via a “consumer
incentive to undergo financial counseling, an offer of attorney representation, and the two
treatments in combination.”)
33
See, e.g., Lea Shepard, Toward A Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm,
53 B.C.L. REV. 1695, 1711-718 (2012) (questioning empirical assumptions associated with an
employer’s use of job applicants’ financial histories and arguing, in part, for a more robust antidiscrimination norm with respect to consumer credit-information regimes due to the potential
racially disparate impact associated with their use.)
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particularly, the behavioral economics movement has dedicated
significant resources “to tak[ing] the core insights and successes of
economics and build[ing] upon them by making more realistic
assumptions about human behavior . . . [seeking to provide] a better
description of the behavior of the agents in society and the economy.” 34
Such scholars have drawn upon psychological and sociological
scholarship that has not only acknowledged the countless cultural and
environmental factors that impact how individuals respond to contractformation stimuli, but have also embraced them as variables to predict
future behavior.
But, this scholarship has failed to acknowledge, explain, or even
identify whether – and how – race, ethnicity, and other sociodemographics impact – or are impacted by – the very disclosure regimes
such scholars seek to change. Thus, celebrated law scholars in this space
whose work is rightly lauded for its general behavioral insights have
remained curiously silent about whether sub-group differences exist in
responding to optimizing information distribution in similar welfare
enhancing ways. 35
Current scholarship denotes disclosure policy as a political device
designed to remedy information asymmetries in the market place. 36
Nonetheless, those endorsing such laws and regulations cannot ignore
evidence identifying the deficiencies in disclosure law’s
implementation. Those questioning the merit of the current regime
predominantly point to “empirical evidence and theories regarding
consumer behavior,” “deficiencies of the disclosures themselves,” as
well as “the [in]ability or [un]likelihood [that] consumers . . . use the

34
Christine Jolls, Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1487 (1998).
35
Pathbreaking in a variety of ways, such works simply fail to engage the role of consumer
race, ethnicity, and culture (as well as sex), as if these variables are not factors in how consumers
receive, process, or act on disclosure. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE
PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012); Oren Bar-Gill, SEDUCTION BY
CONTRACT (2012); Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE (2015). Perhaps one reason these scholars
and others see disclosure as so ineffective is precisely because of its lack of experimental
differentiation with terms across consumer sub-groups. Compare this absence of discussion in
commercial law literature with the engagement of race variables and critical theory in other
substantive fields, such as health law. See, e.g., Khiara Bridges, Terence Keel & Osagie K.
Obasogie, Introduction: Critical Race Theory & the Health Sciences, in Symposium Critical
Race Theory & the Health Sciences, 43 AM. J. OF LAW & MED. 179 (2017).
36
Matthew A. Edwards, Empirical and Behavioral Critiques of Mandatory Disclosure:
Socio-Economics and the Quest for Truth in Lending, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 199
(2005).
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information” 37 among the reasons for its ineffectiveness. Perhaps the
absence of much socio-demographic information is the real cause.
Scholars have also identified the possibility of supply-side issues –
that the complexity and volume of information may render it
meaningless to a confused or overwhelmed consumer. First, evidence
has shown that complexities in the law itself can stunt the compliance
efforts of regulated entities. 38 While this is true for all populations, there
is increasing evidence that demonstrates that the complexity is
particularly salient for population sub-groups more so than the general
population and that it causes members of these sub-groups to make, on
average, more inefficient decisions with the same information. 39
Similarly, an oft-cited defect of contract-formation that behavioral
theorists recognize is “information overload,” the argument that
“consumers [are] cognitively unable to cope with the voluminous nature
of the mandated . . . disclosures.” 40 With respect to TILA, subsequent to
its 1980 emendation, scholarship dedicated to dissecting this particular
issue somewhat subsided. 41 Nonetheless, “home mortgage borrowers
[are still] . . . buried in paper, with little guidance as to which documents
contain the most crucial information to facilitate credit decisionmaking.” 42 Most (if not all) consumers find this problem familiar, as
they attempt to process overwhelming amounts of information online to
make the most efficient contracting choices.
II. IMPLEMENTATION
The following examples build on a premise not universally shared
by BLE scholars – that particular population sub-groups may exhibit
non-random decision-making errors with respect to evaluating contract
disclosures and terms. 43 This non-random error distribution can result
Id. at 204.
Id.
39
See, e.g., Kleimann Communication Group, KNOW BEFORE YOU OWE: POST-PROPOSAL
CONSUMER TESTING FOR THE CFPB OF THE SPANISH AND REFINANCE INTEGRATED TILARESPA DISCLOSURES (2015) (discussed infra).
40
Edwards, supra note 36, at 221.
41
Edwards attributes three explanations to this: (1) “the application of information overload
theory to legal regulation has been subjected to a significant amount of scrutiny and criticism,”
(2) wariness surrounding “advocating a position that might lead towards recommendations of
less disclosure for consumers,” and finally, (3) that the amended regulations arguably
“ameliorated the worst of TILA’s overload problems.” Id. at 222.
42
Id. at 223.
43
See, e.g., Shmuel I. Becher et. al., supra note 29 (explaining that certain BLE assumptions
about consumer financial behavior are not evenly associated with certain groups – and may be
particularly flawed for marginalized groups.)
37
38
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from a variety of causes. Here, I’ll focus on three of them: (a) language
barriers, (b) unique socio-demographic differences in the processing or
utilization of information, or (c) a non-randomly distributed lack of
engagement with information. Each of these root causes, if proven,
would lead to a different set of proposed information-based solutions
particularly suitable for digital transactions, in part because the costs
typically associated with the deployment of socio-demographically
varied disclosure and terms in print form would be substantially
reduced. We can think about these solutions as falling within three broad
frameworks: (a) improving contract-formation utility by clarification,
(b) improving contract-formation utility by addition of group-relevant
topics, and (c) improving contract-formation utility by individuation.
Each of these solutions requires the gathering and use of sociodemographic variables and robust evidence testing. Each of them is also
particularly easy to test and execute for digital contracts, because a
controlled experiment incorporating the modification of contract terms
or disclosure language and evaluating differential responses can be
accomplished at higher speed and lower cost than creating, distributing,
and evaluating responses from differentiated printed and distributed
versions of the same material.
Example: Online Credit Card Applications
In order to prove a claim that the utility of information might vary
across subgroups, one would prefer empirical validation from realworld evidence. Lacking that in this case forces speculation – on both
sides. On the one hand, BLE scholars assume without proof that no
differences exist, and their models reflect this. Here, as a thought
experiment, let me illustrate a universe where the utility of contractformation information does vary across subgroups – in order to
postulate what we might do in response were this to be so.
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First, let us imagine a scenario where, prior to the implementation of
the Credit Card Accountability and Disclosure (“CARD”) Act’s revised
disclosure and education model, a simulated online test was run using
three versions of that model. One of the goals of the new model
embedded within the CARD Act is to educate consumers that an
increase in the amount paid per month will reduce the overall cost of a
medium-term extension of credit. 44 The goal is to increase monthly
payments through the education function of disclosure, which over time
will enhance the welfare of consumers because they will spend less
money for the extension of credit over time. Let us speculate that three
different versions of online disclosure were tested with that goal in
mind, across particular demographic sub-groups with the same number
of participants, with results as follows: 45

In the above experimental framework, the primary goal is to
maximize the additional monthly payment of the consumer population
as a whole in order to reduce the long-term cost of credit. In that
scenario, Disclosure B is the optimal choice, because it maximizes the
average additional payment for the entire population. But what if the
information effects of the disclosure are not randomly distributed across
different groups? Disclosures A and C represent that scenario, which
this Article suggests is more likely than not. Comparing Disclosure A to
Disclosure C, if the goal is to maximize overall welfare, Disclosure C is
the preferred choice. Most groups will increase their minimum
payments, even if two groups do not. But if the goal is to increase
44
See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Ryan Bubb, Credit Card Pricing: The CARD Act and Beyond,
97 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 969, 1003-05 (2012).
45
The amount is the increase in average monthly payments made pursuant to a given type
of disclosure, with red amounts signifying that the disclosures resulted in a decreased average
monthly payment.
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payments while also minimizing harm (reducing payments), Disclosure
A is the correct choice. How then to maximize utility for all groups? In
the world of digital contracting, it would be possible, instantly, to
display the utility maximizing disclosure at the beginning of the
formation process – to different consumer groups – yielding optimal
choices.
The aforementioned example illustrate the limits of both the law and
economics and BLE approaches to disclosure and contract formation. It
is not just that consumers are not rational. It is not just that BLE insights
can help reduce general error rates across the entire population. In fact,
it may be that error rates are non-randomly distributed across groups for
a variety of reasons, and if so, corrective measures require a
differentiated and discriminating contract formation regime to
maximize the utility of sub-groups collectively. This will allow for
higher social welfare across all groups compared to a standardized
approach using a single blunt disclosure instrument or formation
method. And digital platforms provide both an easy test method and a
cost-less ability to make contract-formation changes.
But why might decision-making errors be non-randomly distributed
across certain consumer populations and how would a race-conscious
contract-formation process solve for them? A few detailed examples
might provide further context. First, language differences might result
in formation inefficiencies. Second, socio-demographic differences
might cause formation inefficiencies. Finally, differentials in consumer
engagement with contract terms and disclosures might cause formation
inefficiencies. Let’s take each case in turn.
A. Language Barriers
Scholars have focused on comprehension issues with respect to
disclosure, insofar as disclosures are to be designed to reflect a uniform
consensus about how standard English language speakers process
information. Even if one accepts as a given that disclosures are generally
designed to reflect text for consumers with an 8th grade reading level, this
still presumes that all consumers read English at that level – and in the
same way. These assumptions are false. 46

46
Almost ¼ of the U.S. population over the age of 5 speaks a language other than English
at home. See, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, 2016 American Community Survey 1-Year Estimates,
Language Spoken At Home by Ability to Speak English for the Population 5 Years and Over
(“2016 ACS Home Language Data”), https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/
pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ACS_15_5YR_B16001&prodType=table.
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One real-life illustration of this fallacy shall suffice. The Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) thoughtfully reassessed its
consumer education program with respect to Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (“RESPA”) and TILA disclosures for home-buyers, and it
launched an innovative new education regime for the entire U.S.
population of mortgage consumers. 47 Proactively recognizing that a large
segment of U.S. home buyers spoke Spanish as a first language, the CFPB
undertook the process of translating the finished English-language
mortgage acquisition information and disclosure materials into Spanish.
This is no small empirical feat. Literal translation – of the Google Translate
variety – is not effective for the sort of sophisticated consumer education
such documents are intended to convey. Further, dictionary translations
across languages have at their core a false equivalency assumption –
namely that standard and familiar terms can be easily translated across
languages without cultural context clues. 48
After the CFPB outsourced its English-language disclosure and
information materials and translated the material for a Spanish language
audience, the CFPB and its language translation team learned through
small-scale focus group testing that the translations were not effective. 49
In their words, their translation team “identified particular concepts that
could pose problems in the translation. These concepts did not translate
directly into Spanish, did not have a definite term across multiple dialects,
or the concepts behind the terms were inherently difficult. These terms
included: Appraisal, Balloon Payment, Borrower, Escrow, Final Payment,
and Origination Charges.” 50
Through extensive revision, the CFPB was able to find the appropriate
language benchmarks, notwithstanding inter-cultural differences in

47
See Alexander Bader, Truly Protecting the Consumer in Light of the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis: How Generally Applicable State Consumer Protection Laws Must Be a Key Tool in
Keeping Lending Institutions Honest, 25 J. CIV. RTS. & ECON. DEV. 767, 782-83 (2011) (“[A]n
unfortunate reality of both RESPA, and its predecessor TILA, is that they had little effect on
borrowers’ decision-making because many mortgages are difficult for a lay person to understand
on his or her own.”).
48
Consider a reverse example. The Korean idiom 똥 묻은 개가 겨 묻은 개 나무란다
literally translates in English to “A dog with feces scolds a dog with husks of grain” when in its
cultural context, is meant to communicate an idea similar to the English-language idiom “People
who live in glass houses shouldn’t throw stones.”
49
The difficulty of having an English dominant approach to multi-lingual focus groups, the
challenge of translating concepts, and the interpretation of the meaning of such concepts as tied
to identity are difficult subjects for any researcher to tackle, especially the CFPB. See, e.g.,
Taeku Lee, Language-of-Interview Effects and Latino Mass Opinion (April 2001). JOHN F.
KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT FACULTY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER SERIES 01-041.
50
See Kleinmann Communication Group, supra note 39, at p. vi.
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interpretation across various Spanish-speaking subgroups. 51 In 2016, the
CFPB’s mortgage disclosure and information regimes were finally
translated to Spanish as a result of an expensive and thoughtful proactive
government response. How should the remaining millions of non-native
English speaking home-buyers be educated about the process of home
ownership? Should government bear the considerable burden of multiple
iterations and translations of standard disclosures? 52 If not, should
financial institutions and other large corporations be accountable? 53 If
neither should be accountable (as most present regimes contemplate), how
should we expect millions of English as a second language speakers to
correctly interpret disclosure materials and contract terms that they not
only do not understand in English but that may, in fact, be incorrectly
“translated” into false-equivalent terms through the use of basic
technological translation devices that consumers might seek on their own?
The solution is straightforward – allowing for consumers to have
unrestricted language opt-in and requiring testing and refining of
translated disclosure by regulated entities. Further, the dissemination cost
(and perhaps the efficacy) of such disclosure is substantially reduced when
it is deployed through digital methods, rather than burdensome traditional
mailings or in-person lengthy disclosure forms.
B. Socio-demographic Decision-Making and Behavioral Differences
Levels of financial education, educational attainment, and the
interactions of those factors with a consumer’s socio-demographics may
structure market choices and contract formation in complicated ways. 54
But the provision of standardized disclosure and standardized contract
terms ignores these differences and assumes a uniform mono-cultural
response. And, financial regulations like the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(“ECOA”) impose race-gathering restrictions on various creditors and
financial institutions and prohibit them from considering a consumer’s
51

Id.
As of January 2019, consumer ECOA guidance brochures, for example, are only available
in English and Spanish. See Final Language Access Plan for the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/11/16/2017-24854/finallanguage-access-plan-for-the-consumer-financial-protection-bureau#footnote-4-p53482 (Last
visited Feb. 24, 2019).
53
Market leaders may benefit by customer acquisition and satisfaction if they engage this
effort. See, e.g., Molly Kissler, 400,000 Chase customers opt for Spanish-language statements,
PHX.
BUS.
J.
(Aug.
6,
2010),
https://www.bizjournals.com/phoenix/stories/2010/08/02/daily72.html (describing Chase’s
commitment to Spanish-language access.)
54
See Richard Epstein, The Dangerous Allure of Libertarian Paternalism, 5 REV. OF
BEHAV. ECON. (2018) at 405-406.
52
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background, even when such consideration might benefit the consumer, or
at the very least, provide the consumer with data that could be used in a
potential claim for effects-based discrimination. 55
Compare the commercial-law approach to race-uniform decisionmaking to decision-making architecture in other areas. For instance,
medical research shows disparities in the ways in which different races and
genders approach medical issues. 56 Analyzing the differences in disease
and treatment across different races/ethnic groups and genders has become
a focus of medical research in topics ranging from lung cancer 57 to heart
disease, 58 including over 200 drugs that currently have an FDA label
including specific genetic recommendations – all in order to maximize not
the “general health” but sub-population health. 59 Thus, health research and
policy increasingly affirmatively discriminates with respect to information
provided to consumers. While this approach has been met by some
55
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Data Limitations and the Fragmented U.S. Financial
Regulatory Structure Challenge Federal Oversight and Enforcement Efforts, CQ
TRANSCRIPTIONS, LLC, 19-20 (July 15, 2009), stating that

A final data limitation is that depository institution regulators generally do not have
access to personal characteristics data (for example, race, ethnicity, and sex) for
nonmortgage loans, such as business, credit card, and automobile loans. In a 2008
report, we reported that Federal Reserve Regulation B generally prohibits lenders from
requesting and collecting such personal characteristic data from applicants for
nonmortgage loans. . . . In the absence of personal characteristic data for nonmortgage
loans, we found that agencies tended to focus their oversight activities more on
mortgage lending rather than on areas such as automobile, credit card, and business
lending that are also subject to fair lending law. . . . [S]uch procedures had a high
potential for error and were time-consuming and costly.
56
Anna Kline, Pathways into Drug User Treatment: The Influence of Gender and
Racial/Ethnic Identity, 31:3 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 323 (1996) (analyzing patterns of
behavior in different races and genders; finding, for instance, that ‘Hispanics’ were more likely
to delay medical treatment than other races due a discomfort or reluctance to acknowledge their
addictions).
57
Delia A. Dempsey et al., Genetic and Pharmacokinetic Determinants of Response to
Transdermal Nicotine in White, Black and Asian Non- Smokers, CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS (2013) (available at doi:10.1038/clpt.2013.159) (stating that lung cancer is
typically correlated with smoking behavior, such as number of cigarettes per day and ability to
quit, and such behavior is linked to the rate of metabolism of nicotine, which varies by race and
ethnicity).
58
Nicholas Wade, Race-Based Medicine Continued... N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2004),
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/14/weekinreview/14nick.html?_r=0 (discussing research that
indicated that the heart disease medication BiDil was more successful in treating Black patients
and discussed the human genome project, which is likely to produce diagnostic tests and
treatments specifically tailored to specific populations).
59
Linda M. Hunt, Nicole D. Truesdell, & Meta J. Kreiner, Genes, Race, and Culture in
Clinical Care: Racial Profiling in the Management of Chronic Illness, 27:2 MED.
ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 253 (2013).
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criticism, medical research continues to look for areas to personalize
medicine – by race – in order to increase its effectiveness. 60
C. Differential Disengagement
Much has been written about whether individuals actually read
disclosure, concluding that they do not, we accept the insights of that
literature as given. 61 Thus, a portion of the population derives no utility
from disclosure. If non-readers generally make less efficient choices for
contract terms, how might the existing disclosure regime be modified to
induce the behavior that it seeks? Questions regarding the quality of
information provided in a disclosure and the nexus of such information to
being read and understood are difficult to answer and rarely asked. 62
Some speculations follow. Perhaps a consumer might opt into interestbased financial education through a disclosure regime by an online
provider. 63 The provider might be permitted to inquire about a consumer’s
key interests (whether sports, dance, film, etc.) Then, disclosures and
explanations of key contract terms could be modified or supplemented
with consumer finance scenarios that directly engaged the consumer’s core
interests. For example, a music fan might receive a disclosure that
involved purchasing a pair of concert tickets on a credit card and
explaining how the face-value of the tickets might not reflect the actual
cost if the tickets were carried as credit card debt for three months at a
given interest rate. Perhaps the information could use music analogies or
local artists as examples to generate more consumer interest and thus
increase the likelihood that the disclosure would be both accessed and
understood.
With due care, lenders could also use cultural references that resonated
with their audience. Thoughtful critics have suggested that tailored
messages during contract formation might prove to be culturally
insensitive. One response might be that, at present, the entire online
60
Id. (stating, “[s]ome argue that taking race/ethnicity into consideration is clinically useful
and can provide convenient insight into a patients’ genetic heritage, behavioral habits, and
socioeconomic status (citation omitted). Others argue that such practices are not scientifically
defensible and may increase disparities by promoting stereotyping.”)
61
See, e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Disclosure Matter?, NYU LAW & ECON. RES.
PAPER NO. 10-54 (2010).
62
See, e.g., J. H. Verkerke, Legal Ignorance and Information-Forcing Rules, 56 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 899, 939 (2015) (evaluating information-forcing default rule research about how
to make such rules effective, and finding only “a few scholars” have produced such work.)
63
See, e.g., Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design as Contract, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1635 (2011)
(providing framework for how such an approach can balance privacy and information security
and be achieved using traditional contract principles).
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contract formation regime is culturally insensitive, because it simply
ignores race and other variables under the guise of a uniform “generic”
disclosure or standard set of formation terms. In short, if consumers who
are not presently engaged with the information in the disclosure were
provided incentives to read the disclosure, those incentives would improve
utility at no cost to those who did not receive the information. 64 Or, more
creatively, disclosures could take the form of videos, snapchats, music, or
other forms of communication that might more effectively reach and
engage the intended audience.65 Though this technique does not require
the use of race variables, the methodology by which customers preferenceordered or shared information might be correlative. 66
Therefore, with respect to the broad categories above (language access
differences, socio-demographic or cultural differences, and information
engagement differences), the gathering of socio-demographic information
and its associated use to calibrate more efficient and effective contracts
would have the net effect of enhancing overall consumer utility and net
utility of marginalized groups. Further, corporations that excel at reducing
such disparities would retain a unique marketplace advantage: proof that
diverse customers of “Citilend” default on loans less frequently,
demonstrate greater increases in credit scores over time, are more likely to
gain access to other credit products, and other such indicators would
enhance Citilend’s customer base and serve to calibrate its brand identity,
particularly within communities that are skeptical of large financial
institutions. 67 But right now, with government controlling and mandating
64
In other contexts, such as Google Ad placement, responses to inquires suggested that
perceived race of the person “queried” was utilized to differentiate ads returned in the query
response, presumably maximized to get a higher click-through rate. See Latanya Sweeney,
Discrimination
in
Online
Ad
Delivery,
DATA
PRIV,
LAB
(2013),
https://dataprivacylab.org/projects/onlineads/1071-1.pdf). Such algorithms could also be used to
create, modify, or supplement disclosures in a manner consistent with the grantee’s requests for
more information.
65
See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1027, 1032–34 (2012).
66
In an alternative framework (separate from race), for example, lenders and issuers could
ask a series of drop-down questions about a consumer’s interests (similar to how Tivo or Netflix
or Amazon fine-tune recommendations based on ratings and/or viewing/buying behavior). This
preference ordering could be used to deliver extremely granular information –making it more
likely to be seen and utilized by the consumer. I thank Josh Bowers for this observation.
67
See, e.g., Erik Oster, Most Marketers Agree Diverse Images in Ads Help a Brand’s
Reputation, According to New Report, ADWEEK (Dec. 5, 2017), available at
https://www.adweek.com/brand-marketing/most-marketers-agree-diverse-images-in-ads-helpa-brands-reputation-according-to-new-report/ (explaining that in product advertising, for
example, “[m]arketers are also recognizing that choosing images that are relatable to diverse
groups benefits their brand’s reputation.”); See also Phil Schrader, Why Committing to LGBT
Equality and Embracing a Diverse Workplace Is So Good for Brands, ADWEEK (April 16, 2017)
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the entirety of the disclosure product in many regimes, the marketplace
value (for providers and consumers) for better financial disclosure, among
other things, is simply unknown. 68
III. OBJECTIONS TO THE SUB-GROUP DISCRIMINATION APPROACH
A restructuring of our existing approaches to contract disclosure and
formation to incorporate consumer-level sub-group differences might raise
a variety of objections. First, what evidence do we have that subgroupspecific disclosures would lead to more efficient consumer behaviors than
the existing disclosure models? Second, the gathering and use of this
information raises online privacy concerns. Third, to successfully
implement a sub-group disclosure and formation model, government must
permit discrimination–or at least delineation–between certain types of subgroups at a time when such discrimination is frowned upon in other
contexts.
The first objection, lack of evidentiary proof of sub-group differential
disclosure efficiency, is firmly rooted in empirics–and an absence of
evidence. We know that a uniform format and dissemination model, in
some contexts, works to enhance decision-making and utility for the group
as a whole. 69 We do not know, as applied, whether it works the same way
for population sub-groups, and there are a variety of reasons discussed
above to think that it may be harmful. The best way that we can acquire
objective answers to that question would be to permit or encourage a
natural information experiment. 70 Those who believe that responses to
disclosure and consumer errors are not randomly distributed across groups
are most likely to permit or encourage a natural information experiment.
Whereas those who believe that consumer errors are randomly distributed
would continue to prefer the current regime. Certainly, large scale focus
group testing could be conducted by corporations, by the CFPB, or by
researchers. But here the focus is on real-world financial behavior and
available at https://www.adweek.com/brand-marketing/why-committing-to-lgbt-equality-andembracing-a-diverse-workplace-is-so-good-for-brands/ ) (LGBT equality measures and subgroup centered initiatives benefit corporations by attracting talent, among other factors.)
68
See, e.g., Bruce R. Huber, The Fair Market Value of Public Resources, 103 CAL. L. REV.
1515, 1552-53 (2015) (describing valuation inefficiencies for public resources when exclusive
government control of the resource obviates natural open-market pricing mechanisms).
69
See generally KAZUHISA TAKEMURA, BEHAVIORAL DECISION THEORY:
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND MATHEMATICAL DESCRIPTIONS OF HUMAN CHOICE BEHAVIOR (2014).
70
See generally Jimenez et. al., supra note 10. Of course, researchers in this space can
conduct focus groups and surveys, which are valid measurement tools and would inform this
discussion. But here one should be particularly concerned with measuring real outcomes under
real conditions–and the most critical experimental tool is thus the changing of disclosure–in
context.
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outcomes for marginalized groups in the United States–not merely
opinions about a consumer’s hypothetical behavior over time–and so any
conclusions drawn from such field or one-off experiments would be
necessarily limited for this reason. 71
But the lack of empirics may exacerbate the problem. For example,
“information on consumer race and ethnicity is required to conduct fair
lending analysis of non-mortgage credit products, but auto lenders and
other non-mortgage lenders are generally not allowed to collect
consumers’ demographic information. As a result, substitute, or “proxy”
information is utilized to fill in information about consumers’
demographic characteristics.” 72 And these proxies are quite imprecise.
The second objection, that encouraging individuals to further identify
race and other socio-demographic factors in online contracting may
implicate privacy concerns, prompts a few responses. 73 First, failing to ask
about socio-demographic factors may signal government’s disinterest or
communicate that government thinks race, in this setting, is not important.
Second, such that permitting the use of such variables enables consumers
to promote self-realization or positive identity construction, the ability to
self-identify race and other factors in consumer contract regimes subject
to certain restrictions can serve to enhance, not undermine, individual
interests. 74 Third, the nexus of socio-demographics to privacy in the digital
era is less clear than one might expect, given that privacy law scholars
have not typically engaged race and other socio-demographics as key data-

71
But see Marianne Bertrand, Dean Karlan, Sendhil Mullainathan, Eldar Shafir, & Jonathan
Zinman, What's Advertising Content Worth? Evidence from a Consumer Credit Marketing Field
Experiment, 125 Q. J. ECON. 263, 263 (2010) (discussing a South African experiment
demonstrating that consumers responded differentially to a loan-advertisement’s experimentally
varied terms and content). However, the path-breaking study was necessarily limited to a
specific context: “mailers were sent exclusively to clients who successfully repaid prior loans
from the Lender. Most had been to a branch within the past year and hence were familiar with
the loan product, the transaction process, the branch’s staff and general environment, and the
fact that loan uses are unrestricted.” Further, the study’s exploration of the nexus of cultural or
racial cues to response rates was inconclusive, “Given our lack of strong priors on how any
advertising content effects might vary with consumer characteristics, and statistical power
issues, we will not devote much space to discussing heterogeneity in responses to advertising
content.”
72
See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Proxy Methdology Report 3 (2014),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201409_cfpb_report_proxy-methodology.pdf.
73
See Shmuel I. Becher et. al., supra note 29, at 31 (acknowledging same with respect to
tailoring proposals to low income consumers); See also Woodrow Hartzog and Frederic
Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (2013).
74
See, e.g., Jonathan D. Kahn, Privacy as a Legal Principle of Identity Maintenance, 33:2
SETON HALL L. REV. 371, 373-74 (2003).
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points warranting additional scrutiny. 75 And, such that socio-demographic
data obtained through this process is abused or misused, government can
design remedies designed to penalize merchants who violate a consumer’s
and the government’s expectations about the sharing, use, or misuse of this
particularly personal information. 76 Alternatively, companies choosing to
gather and use such data for these purposes could be encouraged to provide
for warnings or disclosures or “demographic opt-outs,” which could
increase transparency and salience for consumers, allowing them to
choose a more generic approach if so desired. 77
The third objection is a moral one, that encouraging the use of sociodemographics in this way encourages invidious discrimination. For those
opposed to this approach, the best way to reduce the likelihood of a
discriminatory market outcome with respect to racial and other sociodemographic sub-groups in the consumer finance disclosure regime would
be to prevent market-actors, government, and digital platforms – from
permitting – and encouraging – discrimination on the basis of race. 78 But
a response might be that we expect the government and private markets to
encourage ‘positive’ discrimination in other contexts – such as affirmative
action – where the utility of such discrimination may not be equally
enhancing for all groups or may be perceived by some to be more harmful
to other groups. Even in these other contexts, the gathering and analysis of
“consumer” data serves as a core component of the analysis of the
effectiveness of such programs. 79
With respect to online contracts in markets that are heavily regulated
by government, such as those governing financial services, mandated
information gathering about race, ethnicity, and other factors is critical for
75
See, e.g., Will Thomas DeVries, Protecting Privacy in the Digital Age, 18 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 283, 305-11 (2003) (surveying the array of concerns as the U.S. transitioned into a
more digitally connected era, suggesting changes to traditional privacy law to modernize its
focus, but not discussing socio-demographic information as an area of concern.)
76
See Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy as Trust: Sharing Personal Information in a Networked
World, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 559, 628 (2015) (reframing privacy debate as one centered on trust
between the sharer and the recipient and identifying a framework valuing “the socially beneficial
effects of sharing and [giving] judges a coherent scheme for answering limited privacy
questions.”)
77
See, e.g., Gerhard Wagner and Horst Eidenmüller, Down by Algorithms? Siphoning Rents,
Exploiting Biases, and Shaping Preferences: Regulating the Dark Side of Personalized
Transactions, 86:2 U. CHI. L. REV. 581 (2019).
78
See Parents Involved in Community Schools vs. Seattle School District #1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
79
See, e.g., Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist
Revision of Affirmative Action, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1063, 1065-66 (2006) (exploring nexus of social
science research about implicit bias and the effectiveness of affirmative action programs as
solutions for discrimination).
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supporting the type of anti-discrimination lawsuits that form the core of
civil rights litigation in a variety of contexts, including acquisition of
credit. For example, in the markets for consumer loans and home
mortgages, lenders subject to the Housing Mortgage Disclosure Act
(“HMDA”) and/or Regulations B 80 and C have long been subject to
rigorous data-gathering requirements, including asking online and inperson borrowers about race and other criteria. On an aggregate level, civil
rights advocates and federal government researchers and law enforcers
have been able to utilize this demographic information in statistical
models, identify disparities across institutions, and then sue to recover
damages and to eliminate racially discriminatory practices.
Absent the gathering of such data as transactions become more
digitized, it is extraordinarily difficult to prove, for example, disparate
impact claims. The data analyses underlying those claims must use proxies
for race, ethnicity, and gender, since the variables themselves are not
collected. Thus, the failure to gather (whether secretly through online
tracking or openly by asking) race and ethnicity information can
unintentionally benefit lenders and financial institutions, because these
proxy methodologies used by regulators are imperfect and tend to
overstate disparities, thus allowing lenders and others to call their validity
into question. 81 It is not terribly hard to find weaknesses in the proxy
measures. For example, the CFPB utilized Census track surname data from
Census 2000 to construct its associated consumer contract race and
ethnicity measures – until April 2017. 82
80
Reg. B institutions that receive “an application for credit primarily for the purchase or
refinancing of a dwelling occupied or to be occupied by the applicant as a principal residence,
where the extension of credit will be secured by the dwelling, shall request as part of the
application” the marital status, age, ethnicity, race, and gender of the applicant. Historically Reg
B data included five data fields: ethnicity, race, sex, marital status, and age, while HMDA
included only ethnicity, race, and sex. Regardless, these socio-demographic variables could be
used in a statistical analysis in order to test for their effects holding constant other factors, like
credit scores.
81
See, e.g., Am. Fin. Serv. Ass’n, Request for Information Regarding the Bureau’s Inherited
Regulations
and
Inherited
Rulemaking
Authorities
2
(June
25,
2018),
https://www.afsaonline.org/portals/0/Legal%20and%20Reg/AFSA%20%20RFI%20on%20Inherited%20Rules%20-%20June%2025%202018.pdf (critiquing the
ability of plaintiffs to prove disparate impact for a variety of reasons, including the lack of selfdisclosed individual level data). But see D Adjaye-Gbewonyo et al., Using the Bayesian
Improved Surname Geocoding Method (BISG) to Create a Working Classification of Race and
Ethnicity in a Diverse Managed Care Population: A Validation Study, 49(1) HEALTH SERV.
RES. 268, 277-81 (2014) (concluding the BISG method [which is the CFPB’s preferred] may
indeed be useful for classifying race/ethnicity of health plan members when needed for health
care studies).
82
See, e.g., Update to Proxy Methodology, GITHUB (Apr. 2017),
https://github.com/cfpb/proxy-methodology.
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Now imagine how such race proxies are operationalized when it comes
to that have become more digitized over time; this digitization does not
necessarily expand anti-discrimination norms nor follow a Bentham-like
utility maximizing path. Consider the case of the CFPB’s now-rescinded
indirect auto-lending discrimination rules. Indirect auto-lenders were
subject to the same ECOA restrictions as credit-card companies–namely
they were forbidden from gathering certain socio-demographic
information, including race, ethnicity, and sex. 83 As a result, it was difficult
to test for disparate impact or discrimination in the auto-lending market,
because such information was not available. However, indirect autolenders engaged in lending practices that yielded differential effects by
racial sub-groups, through practices such as differential mark-ups on the
“dealer reserve”. 84 To solve for the information-analytics gap, civil rights
advocates lobbied the CFPB and others to allow for the use of “race
proxies” in the data-analysis process, because neither in-person nor online
transactions permitted its acquisition.
But this use of such proxies gave indirect auto-lenders an easy
rhetorical target–a flawed methodology would lead to industry ruin. When
indirect auto-lenders saw that the CFPB intended to subject them to ECOA
scrutiny for alleged discriminatory pricing racial disparities using this
flawed methodology, they lobbied Congress to overturn the regulation. 85
And, though not solely for that reason, Congress agreed. The indirect autolending regulation was overturned on May 21, 2018. 86 Now the leading
online direct/indirect auto-lending markets still lack broad-based race-data
and may have discriminatory racial impacts, but there is still no way to
directly test for such impacts or to provide consumers with a sociodemographically attuned contract model. This same lack of supply-side
socio-demographic information from those searching for online pay-day
loans also undermines efforts to prove that pay-day lending contracts are
discriminatory. 87
83
See
Cons.
Fin.
Prot.
Bureau,
CFPB
Bulletin
2013-2
(2013),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_march_-Auto-Finance-Bulletin.pdf
(describing the CFPB’s then-interpretation of ECOA with respect to indirect auto-lenders).
84
They were able to mask discriminatory behavior, in part, due to the absence of race data
associated with each consumer contract.
85
See, e.g., Daniel Goldstein, Car Dealers Win First Round in Congress Against CFPB
Over
Auto
Loan
Discrimination,
MARKETWATCH
(Aug.
1,
2015),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/did-congress-just-make-it-easier-for-auto-dealers-todiscriminate-against-you-2015-08-01.
86
See Cons. Fin. Prot. Bureau, Indirect Auto Lending and Compliance with the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (Mar. 21, 2013), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_march_Auto-Finance-Bulletin.pdf.
87
See, e.g., Paige Marta Skiba, Regulation of Payday Loans: Misguided?, 69 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1023, 1038-41 (2012).
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CONCLUSION
Scholars have improved both traditional and digital contract disclosure
and formation models by incorporating behavioral insights in an effort to
improve choice architecture and enhance overall utility. But these efforts
fail to engage the utility of tracking the effect of race on contracting norms,
selection of contracting terms, and contract literacy/engagement. To
encourage the gathering (and the analysis) of such information,
particularly when government has a role in the contract-acquisition and
formation process between merchants and consumers, government must
mandate that online disclosures and consumer contracts seek race and
other demographic information. It is clear that the present incarnation of
the CFPB, which could lead this effort, seems to have substantially
downgraded the importance of analyzing race, sex, and other sociodemographic factors related to consumer information provision and
consumer anti-discrimination principles in both print and digital spaces. 88
We are just at the beginning stages of understanding how race matters
in consumer disclosure and consumer contracts. But, if gathering and
experimenting with such information allows for online platforms to
customize interfaces and disclosures such that they more effectively reach
and engage diverse consumers, then there may be an increase consumer
utility. Further, a more transparent gathering and use of such data will
allow government (and private actors) to better maintain and enforce antidiscrimination principles because they can monitor outcomes in ways that
are presently deeply imperfect. Although this race-conscious approach can
be operationalized across many sectors, its value may be most salient in
digital transactions in regulated industries, such as consumer finance,
where government has the greatest interest in evaluating market
engagement of consumers of various racial backgrounds to ensure
fairness.

88
See, e.g., Cons. Fin. Prot. Bureau, Summer 2018: Supervisory Highlights, 12 (Sept. 2018),
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/bcfp_supervisory-highlights_issue-17_201809.pdf (discussing none of these subjects, absent a single sentence).

